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THE LACK OF AN EMPIRICAL




A decade ago in a paper,“Reassessing Discretionary
Fiscal Policy,” published in the Journal of Economic
Perspectives, I concluded that “in the current context
of the US economy, it seems best to let fiscal policy
have its main countercyclical impact through the
automatic stabilizers … It would be appropriate in
the current circumstances for discretionary fiscal
policy to be saved explicitly for longer term issues,
requiring less frequent changes”. This was not an
unusual conclusion at the time. As Eichenbaum
(1997) put it, “there is now widespread agreement
that countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy is nei-
ther desirable nor politically feasible”, or, according
to Feldstein (2002),“there is now widespread agree-
ment in the economics profession that deliberate
‘countercyclical’ discretionary policy has not con-
tributed to economic stability and may have actually
been destabilizing in the past”.
Despite this widespread agreement of a decade ago,
there has recently been a dramatic revival of interest
in discretionary fiscal policy. The purpose of this
short paper is to review the empirical evidence dur-
ing the past decade and determine whether it calls
for such a revival. I find that it does not.
Experiences with two temporary tax rebates
The most visible explicitly countercyclical discre-
tionary policy experiences during the past decade
have been the large temporary tax rebates of 2001
and 2008.In both cases rebate payments were made
to individuals and families for several months dur-
ing the year, either in the form of checks, direct
deposits, or temporary changes in tax withholding
rates. The specific months in each year and the
aggregate amounts paid in each month are shown
in Table 1, where the data are stated in billions of
dollars at annual rates as reported by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (2001 and 2008). In the case of
2001, the recession started in March 2001 and
ended in November; in the case of 2008, the reces-
sion started in December 2007 and was ongoing
well beyond August 2008. Hence, in both cases the
payments were made while the recession was still
ongoing and thereby exhibit virtually no response
or implementation lag which was a criticism of such
discretionary fiscal policy actions in the past. Lack
of good timing was not a fault in either of these
more recent experiences.
The macroeconomic theory that rationalizes such
temporary rebate payments is that they increase
the demand for consumption, stimulate aggregate
demand, and thereby help get the economy on a
path to recovery. But what do the data show?
Figure 1 illustrates the rebate of 2008. The upper
red line shows disposable personal income for the
months from January 2007 through October 2008.
The data are seasonally adjusted and are stated at
annual rates. Disposable personal income is the
total amount of income after taxes and government
transfers;it therefore includes the rebate payments.
Subtracting the rebate payments from the top line
results in the yellow line in Figure 1, which shows
what disposable personal income would have been
without the rebates. Notice the sharp increase in
disposable personal income in May when rebates
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.were mailed or deposited in people’s bank
accounts. Disposable personal income then started
to come down in June and July as total payments
declined and by August had returned to the trend
that was prevailing in April.
The lower blue line in Figure 1 is personal consump-
tion expenditures over the same period. Observe
that consumption shows no noticeable increase at
the time of the rebate. As the picture illustrates the
temporary rebate did little or nothing to stimulate
consumption demand, and thereby aggregate
demand, or the economy. In fact, recently revised
data shows that consumption began declining in July
2008 and continued to decline through October.
While Figure 1 is very revealing, policy evaluation
requires going beyond graphs and testing for the
impact of the rebates on aggregate consumption
using more formal regression techniques such as
shown in Table 2.The regressions in Table 2 pertain
to the period from the start of 2000 through the third
quarter of 2008 and thus include both the 2001 and
the 2008 rebate periods.To test whether the rebates
had a positive and significant effect on consumption,
I include both personal disposable income without
the rebates and the rebate payments as two separate
variables in the regressions. To allow for lagged
effects of changes in income I include a lagged
dependent variable in the equations.
The first column of Table 2 shows that the impact of
the rebate is statistically insignificant and much
smaller than the significant impact of disposable
personal income excluding the rebate.This confirms
the results illustrated in Figure 1 and extends them
to the 2001 as well as the 2008
rebates. But an advantage of
using regressions is that one can
include other factors that affect
consumption. For example, the
second regression in Table 2
includes the price of oil which
would be expected to have a
depressing effect on consump-
tion. It is important to try to
control for oil prices because the
rebates could have a positive
impact once one takes account
of the negative effect of oil
prices, especially in 2008 when
oil prices rose very rapidly in the
spring and summer. Because the
impact of oil price changes occurs with a lag, I tried
several alternative lag lengths for the oil price vari-
able.Table 2 reports the case where the impact was
the highest so as to give the rebate variable the
greatest opportunity to have a statistically signifi-
cant effect. Note that while the coefficient on the
rebate variable is higher with the oil price variable
than without,it is still not statistically different from
zero.These results are robust to changes in the sam-
ple period and specification. For example, sample
periods that include only one rebate episode also
show no significant effects of the rebate. Nor do
specifications that use real rather than nominal vari-
ables, include other factors such as interest rates, or
adjust for serial correlation rather than use a lagged
dependent variable.
These results are consistent with the permanent
income theory or life cycle theory of consumption
in which temporary increases in income are pre-
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PCE regressions with rebate payments








Disp. pers. income .206 .188
(w/o rebate)  (.056) (.055)
Oil price ($/bbl –  – 1.007
lagged 3 months)  (.325)
R
2 .999 .999
Note: The dependent variable is personal con-
sumption expenditures. Standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses. The oil price is for West
Texas Intermediate. The sample period is 
January 2000 to October 2008.
Source: Author’s calculation.CESifo Forum 2/2009 11
Focus
dicted to lead to proportionately smaller increases
in consumption than permanent increases in
income. In these regressions a temporary increase
in income – represented by the rebate variable –
has a small and statistically insignificant effect. In
contrast when the increase in income is more per-
manent – as represented in these regressions by the
personal disposable income variable without rebate
– then the change in consumption is larger and sta-
tistically significant.
The results are also consistent with earlier macro-
economic time series studies (Blinder 1981) of tem-
porary government payments or surcharges in the
1960s and 1970s which later became incorporated in
macroeconomic textbooks. Indeed, it was such per-
manent income theories and the empirical studies
supporting them that led many economists to con-
clude that such discretionary fiscal policy actions
are not a good policy tool.That consensus apparent-
ly broke down during the debates about the fiscal
stimulus of 2008 when a number of economists
wrote and testified that such a temporary rebate
program would be an effective stimulus – see e.g.
Elmendorf and Furman (2008), Summers (2008)
and Council of Economic Advisers (2008). One rea-
son for that change in view by some economists at
the time might have been the apparent success of
rebate payments made in 2001. However, those
were part of more permanent multiyear tax cuts
passed that same year which would be expected by
the permanent income theory to boost consumption
and the economy.
Of course, the permanent income and life cycle the-
ories are approximations and do not take account of
liquidity constraints which make it difficult for some
consumers to borrow;thus they may spend more out
of temporary income than predicted by the theory.
In fact, using micro survey data Johnson, Parker and
Souleles (2006) found significant effects for the 2001
rebate payments and this too may have led to a
change in views around the time of the 2008 rebates.
More recently Broda and Parker (2008) found that
individuals in their micro survey spent a statistically
significant amount of the 2008 rebates,but apparent-
ly this was not enough to move aggregate consump-
tion as shown in Figure 1.
In sum,recent evidence on the impact of rebate pay-
ments on aggregate consumption does not provide a
rationale for a revival in discretionary countercycli-
cal fiscal policy.
Model simulations and the impact of government
purchases
The ineffectiveness of the 2008 rebate payments as
a stimulus to consumption has recently led to pro-
posals to increase government purchases as an alter-
native stimulus. While increasing government pur-
chases will certainly raise GDP in the short run
more than temporary rebates,it is not clear that this
will be any more effective in stimulating a sustained
economic recovery.Indeed,even if the impact of the
tax rebates was to raise consumption significantly
more than shown than in Figure 1, the increase
would have been temporary, probably following the
pattern of the rebate in Figure 1. It is difficult to see
how such a temporary blip in consumption would
lead to a sustained expansion of a large dynamic
economy.
There is little evidence that short government
impulses will jump start an economy adversely
affected by other forces.In the current recession,the
economy has been pulled down by the housing
slump, the financial crisis, and the lagged effects of
high energy prices. Expectations of future income
and employment growth are low because the effects
of the financial crisis are expected to last for years
into the future. Unless these effects are addressed, a
short-term fiscal stimulus has little chance of causing
a sustained recovery.
The theory that a short-run stimulus will jump start
the economy is based on older “Keynesian” theories
which do not adequately include, in my view, the
complex dynamic or general equilibrium effects of a
modern international economy. Nor do they usually
include endogenous (or rational) expectations of the
future. The problems with such models can be illus-
trated by again using the evidence from the rebates,
and I believe similar problems arise when analyzing
other stimulus proposals as well. For example,
according to model simulations of Zandi (2008),
GDP would have risen by about a dollar and a quar-
ter for every dollar of a refundable one-time rebate.
But Figure 1 and Table 2 show that in reality the
impact was only a few pennies for each dollar and
insignificantly different from zero in 2008. One
needs to understand why the models were in error
before using the same models to analyze the impacts
of new types of proposals for 2009. In contrast, sim-
ulations of my (1992) empirically estimated multi-
country dynamic model with rational expectations
indicates that multiyear changes in governmentspending phased in at realistic
rates have a maximum govern-
ment spending multiplier less
than one because of offsetting
reductions in the other compo-
nents of GDP.
To be sure, it may be appropri-
ate to increase government pur-
chases in some areas including
for infrastructure as in the 1950s when the interstate
highway system was built. But such multiyear pro-
grams did not help end, mitigate, or prevent the
recessions of the 1950s. In sum, there is little reliable
empirical evidence that government spending is a
way to end a recession or accelerate a recovery that
rationalizes a revival of discretionary countercyclical
fiscal policy.
Recent experience with the automatic stabilizers
The earlier widespread view of fiscal policy was that
instead of focusing on discretionary countercyclical
actions it should focus on the automatic stabilizers as
well as on more lasting long run reforms that benefit
the economy, from tax reform, to entitlement
reform, to infrastructure spending, to keeping the
debt to GDP ratio in line. Is there any change in the
behavior of the automatic stabilizers which would
change this view?
Table 3 provides evidence of how the automatic sta-
bilizers have changed over time. It is an update of a
similar table and analysis in my 2000 paper. It
divides the total federal budget deficit on a quarter-
ly basis into two components:a structural part and a
cyclical part.The structural part is a quarterly inter-
polation of the annual number reported by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). According to
CBO methodology the structural deficit is affected
by changes in tax rates or spending programs such
as the 1982 tax rate cuts, the 1993 tax rate increases
and the 2001 tax rate cuts. The structural deficit is
also affected by changes in the economy such as
changes in the income distribution or the share of
income in different tax categories. The cyclical part
is computed in Table 3 as the difference between
total deficit and the structural part.
To measure how the automatic stabilizers have
changed over time I regressed each of these mea-
sures (structural, cyclical and total) as a percentage
of GDP separately on the percentage GDP gap. I
used the CBO measure of potential GDP to com-
pute the GDP gap which results in a reasonable
description of the ups and downs of the economy at
a business cycle frequency. I report the slope coeffi-
cients from each of these regressions in Table 3 for
several different sample periods.All the coefficients
are highly statistically significant. As computed, the
sum of the coefficients in the first two columns
should equal the coefficient in last column except for
rounding errors.
Table 3 shows that there indeed have been large
changes in the relation between these measures of
the deficit and the GDP gap.While the coefficient on
the cyclical component has remained fairly constant
around 1/3, the coefficient on the structural compo-
nent has increased dramatically over time. In fact,
the cyclical movements in the structural deficit have
overtaken the cyclical movements in the cyclical
deficit. More research is needed to determine exact-
ly why this change has occurred. It is important to
determine whether this high responsiveness will con-
tinue into the current recession. If so, the automatic
stabilizers will be very powerful and the deficit will
increase significantly on this account. In any case,
Table 3 provides no evidence to change the “wide-
spread agreement” of a decade ago to focus fiscal
policy on the automatic stabilizers rather than on
discretionary countercyclical actions. It may suggest
the opposite.
Changes in monetary policy effectiveness
Another reason for the widespread view a decade
ago about fiscal policy was that monetary policy had
improved after the late 1960s and 1970s and played
an essential countercyclical role as it achieved both
greater price and output stability during the great
moderation. However, there were also concerns
expressed about the limits of monetary policy if the
zero bound on interest rates were to be reached as it
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Table 3  
Simple regression coefficients of deficit components on GDP gap
Sample period Structural Cyclical Total
1983:1 – 1994:4 
1983:1 – 1997:4 
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had in Japan in the 1990s.The recent change in mon-
etary policy in the United States and the resulting
constraint of the zero bound is another reason why
some are calling for discretionary fiscal policy
actions.
In my view, however, the experience during the past
decade does not show that monetary policy is inef-
fective or that fiscal policy is more appropriate when
the short term interest rate reaches the lower bound
of zero. Indeed, the lesson from Japan is that it was
the shift toward increasing money growth – quanti-
tative easing – in 2001 that finally led to the end of
the lost decade of the 1990s. It was certainly not dis-
cretionary fiscal policy actions. Increasing money
growth – or simply preventing it from falling as in
the Great Depression – remains a powerful counter-
cyclical policy.
While a full treatment of monetary policy in the cur-
rent environment is well beyond the scope of this
paper, there is no evidence in the past decade that
suggests that monetary policy has run out of ammu-
nition and must be supplemented by discretionary
fiscal actions.
Conclusion
A decade ago there was widespread agreement that
fiscal policy should avoid countercyclical discre-
tionary actions and instead should focus on the auto-
matic stabilizers and on longer term fiscal reforms
that positively affect economic growth and provide
appropriate government services, including infra-
structure and national defense.In this paper I briefly
summarized the empirical evidence during the past
decade on (1) the temporary rebate programs of
2001 and 2008, (2) macro-econometric model simu-
lations, (3) the changing cyclical response of the
automatic stabilizers, and (4) the role of monetary
policy in a zero interest situation. Based on this
review I see no empirical rationale for a revival of
countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy.
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